Bamberg / Spremann Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Erscheinungsjahr 2012
ISBN: 978-3-642-75060-1
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 533 Seiten, eBook

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bamberg, Günter

Spremann, Klaus

Weitere Mitwirkende

Ballwieser, W.

Bamberg, G.

Beckmann, M.J.

Bester, H.

Blickle, M.

Ewert, R.

Feichtinger, G.

Firchau, V.

Fricke, F.

Funke, H.

Gaynor, M.

Gruber, A.

Hartmann-Wendels, T.

Hellwig, M.

Kaulmann, T.

Kleindorfer, P.R.

Krahnen, J.P.

Meran, G.

Milde, H.

Pfingsten, A.

Schanze, E.

Schmidt, R.H.

Schneider, D.

Sorger, G.

Spremann, K.

Swoboda, P.

Voeller, J.

Wagenhofer, A.

Wilhelm, J.E.B.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Prologue.- Section 1 Agency Theory and Risk Sharing.- Agent and Principal.- Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information.- Risk Sharing and Subcontracting.- Section 2 Information and Incentives.- Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems.- Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts.- Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods.- Incentives to Forecast Honestly.- Section 3 Capital Markets and Moral Hazard.- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues.- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem.- On Stakeholders’ Unanimity.- Section 4 Financial Contracting and Dividends.- Signalling and Market Behavior.- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information.- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis.- Section 5 External Accounting and Auditing.- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting.- Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation.- Auditing in an Agency Setting.- Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information.- Section 6 Coordination in Groups.- Managers as Principals and Agents.- Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations.- Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach.- Section 7 Property Rights and Fairness.- Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm.- Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making.- A Note on Fair Equality of Rules.- Section 8 Agency Costs.- Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets.- Agency Costs are not a “Flop”!.- About Contributors.- Author Index.