Austin Churchill and Malta

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-7509-6704-4
Verlag: Spellmount
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 192 Seiten

This is the compelling story of the special relationship between Winston Churchill and the people of Malta. During six visits over a period of forty years he came to understand and support the aspirations of the Maltese people and in the Second World War the bonds linking them were tempered in fire and destruction. In those dark days Churchill's determination to defend the island and his faith in the courage of the Maltese people never wavered.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Austin, Douglas

Leseproben

CHAPTER II
The Malta Conference, May 1912,
and Its Consequences
We cannot possibly hold the Mediterranean or guarantee any of our interests there until we have obtained a decision in the North Sea. Churchill letter to Lord Haldane, 6 May 1912 Winston Churchill’s second arrival at Valletta was markedly different from the first. In 1907 he had disembarked late at night from the Syracuse ferry. Five years later in the morning light of Wednesday 29 May 1912 he sailed into the Grand Harbour as First Lord of the Admiralty standing on the bridge of the gleaming 3,500-ton Admiralty yacht, HMS Enchantress. Alongside him stood, among others, the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, and his daughter, Violet. In her book, Winston Churchill As I Knew Him, Violet Bonham-Carter has described being summoned on deck by Churchill as the Enchantress approached Malta. The Island we were approaching looked like one vast fortress, a great heap of battlemented stone built between sky and sea. We sailed into the most wonderful harbour I could have imagined or dreamt of. —‘harbour of harbours’—strongholds and fortresses piled up on every side, Men of War hoisting their colours with bugle calls from every deck. Grandees of all sorts began to arrive in pinnaces—all the Admirals in the first, followed by their Flag-Lieutenants, then Ian Hamilton with a military contingent and finally Lord Kitchener looking quite splendid, treble life-size—but alas! dressed as a civilian in a Homburg hat.1 Much had happened in Churchill’s official and private life since his previous visit to Malta but, by his own account, by far the most important event was his marriage on 12 September 1908 to Clementine Hozier. Her father, Sir Henry Hozier, who had died a year earlier, had been Secretary of Lloyds and in that capacity was well known to the commercial and shipping community in Malta. As a result Mr. Giovanni Messina, President of the Malta Chamber of Commerce, wrote to Churchill on 31 August 1908: As a token of the Chamber’s respectful homage and hearty greetings, I beg, on my behalf and that of my colleagues, you would condescend to present for its acceptance to Miss Clementine Hozier a reproduction of a Gozo sailing boat … wishing you and Miss Hozier a happy and prosperous life.2 Clementine stood beside her husband as Enchantress steamed into the Grand Harbour on that May morning. In the years since joining the Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade Churchill had become Home Secretary in February 1910, and then, in October 1911, had been appointed by Asquith as First Lord of the Admiralty exchanging positions with Reginald McKenna. In the first volume of The World Crisis, his subsequent history of the First World War, Churchill described his visit to Asquith’s Scottish residence, and his joy at being offered the Admiralty. The fading light of evening disclosed in the far distance the silhouettes of two battleships slowly steaming out of the Firth of Forth. They seemed invested with a new significance to me. ‘I was to endeavour’ he added, ‘to discharge this responsibility for the four most memorable years of my life.’3 His joy was not shared by the many supporters of the Navy. This was due in large part to his vehement support of Lloyd George in 1909 when the latter, as Chancellor, had opposed McKenna’s plans to build six new dreadnought battleships. To support McKenna Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, orchestrated a campaign in the press with the slogan, ‘We want eight, we won’t wait!’ Churchill himself attracted widespread criticism. Lord Knollys, the King’s Secretary, wrote to Lord Esher on 10 February 1909: What are Winston’s reasons for acting as he does in this matter? Of course it cannot be from conviction or principle. The very idea of his having either is enough to make anyone laugh.4 A fierce struggle within the Cabinet ensued before agreement was reached that only four would be laid down in 1909-10 but with the understanding that four more might be ordered later if circumstances warranted. The subsequent news that both Italy and Austria had announced their intention to build new dreadnought battleships then triggered the construction of the additional four British ships. As Churchill later wrote: ‘The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight.’5 Since 1909, however, and particularly after the Agadir crisis in the summer of 1911 had brought Britain and Germany to the brink of war, Churchill had become convinced of the need for a powerful modern Navy. Moreover, during the crisis a conference summoned on 23 August by Asquith to consider what actions would be necessary should war with Germany break out revealed an alarming discrepancy between the war plans of the War Office and those, such as they were, of the Admiralty. It was these considerations that persuaded Asquith that a change at the Admiralty was essential and that Churchill should replace McKenna as First Lord. As Geoffrey Best has written: ‘There was indeed a very great deal to do, and Churchill had been put there to do it. The largest navy in the world was no longer quite the best, and the world had become a riskier place.’6 It was, consequently, matters of imperial defence that brought Churchill to Valletta on 29 May 1912. Violet Bonham-Carter in the book quoted above has left a vivid impression of the social aspects of this high-level visit. There were numerous receptions, official visits, inspections, and, in the evenings, banquets and dances. On Friday 1 June she, together with her father, Churchill, and all the Admirals embarked on the battleship HMS Cornwallis to witness firing at sea. She recounted how, after a prolonged period of shooting at a towed target four miles away: Winston was itching with impatience to know how many ‘hits’ had been scored. I shall never forget his face when Admiral Poe broke to him that there had been—none!—‘Not one? All misses? How can you explain it?’—The Admiral’s reply did not have a soothing effect: ‘Well—you see, First Lord, the shells seem to have either fallen just short of the target or else gone just a little beyond it.’ I will not describe what followed …7 However, the main purpose of the visit was to confer with Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, at that time Commander-in-Chief and Agent-General in Egypt, about Mediterranean security. Kitchener arrived at Valletta from Alexandria an hour before Churchill on the cruiser HMS Hampshire. Tragically, it was on the same cruiser that he was to lose his life four years later when it struck a mine as it left Scapa Flow while taking him on a mission to Russia. By May 1912 a complex and threatening naval situation had developed.8 Not long after Churchill had moved to the Admiralty Anglo-German naval rivalry, which was initiated in 1898 when Germany had decided to build a battle fleet, was intensified by advance notification of the proposed German Naval Law of 1912. This provided for further expansion of the German battle fleet. The threat posed to Britain by this growing modern fleet was underlined, firstly, by a proposed increase in German naval personnel that would allow a large proportion of these capital ships to be kept in full commission, and secondly, by plans to widen the Kiel Canal to allow more rapid concentration of the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. Diplomatic attempts to seek a rapprochement with Germany having failed, Churchill proposed to meet this threat in two ways. Firstly, when presenting the 1912 Naval Estimates to the House of Commons on 18 March he announced the Government’s intention to maintain a superiority of 60% in dreadnought battleships over the German fleet as then planned and to lay down two new keels for every additional ship built by Germany. Secondly, however, the growing concern about a surprise attack across the North Sea made it imperative, in Churchill’s view, that Britain’s capital ships and, equally importantly, its trained officers and ratings be concentrated in Home waters. This meant the recall of the Atlantic Fleet based at Gibraltar and two of the six battleships hitherto based at Malta. The other four would be moved to Gibraltar to form the Fourth Battle Squadron. From there they could, in theory, operate in either sea. However, on 6 May Churchill made clear in a letter to Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, his central argument for the new distribution of the fleet. We cannot possibly hold the Mediterranean or guarantee any of our interests there until we have obtained a decision in the North Sea. The War-plans for the last 5 years have provided for the evacuation of the Meditern as the first step consequent on a war with Germany, & all we are doing is to make peace dispositions wh approximate to war necessities. It would be vy foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt. He went on to write that if another fleet of dreadnought battleships could be provided for the Mediterranean ‘the attitude of the Adm’y will be that of a cat to a nice fresh dish of cream.’ He did not, however, regard this as ‘practical politics’.9 Churchill’s plan to concentrate against the escalating North Sea danger was only a continuation of a policy initiated by the Admiralty in the early years of the century when the German naval challenge had first arisen. This had resulted in the withdrawal of battleships from the...