Buch, Englisch, 352 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 237 mm, Gewicht: 662 g
Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers
Buch, Englisch, 352 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 237 mm, Gewicht: 662 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-768906-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Peirce argues that each genus of inference--deduction, induction, and abduction--has a different truth-producing virtue. An inference is valid just in case the procedure used in fact has the truth-producing virtue claimed for it and the person making the inference adheres to the procedure. In successive chapters, this book shows how Peirce supports the thesis that these genera of inference have the truth-producing virtues claimed for them and how Peirce responds to objections. Among the objections given consideration are the liar paradox, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's new riddle of induction, that this may be a chance world, and that we are incapable of conceiving the true hypothesis. The book defends several controversial theses, including that Peirce does not so strongly object to Bayesianism as is sometimes claimed and that prior to 1900 Peirce had no explicit theory of abduction. It also proposes a novel account of abduction.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: Neuzeit
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Mathematik, Philosophie der Physik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
- Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematik Allgemein Philosophie der Mathematik