Adomeit Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev

An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews
2. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-3-8452-6611-4
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 48, 756 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

This book focuses on the dynamics which led to the division of Germany – a process that occurred by default rather than design; the role played in that process by the Soviet Union under Stalin; the reasons why his successors, from Khrushchev to the Communist Party general secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, stubbornly clung to the division of Germany for almost half a century; their increasing realisation of the ‘costs of an empire’; the failure of their attempts to stop East Germany’s increasing dependence on West Germany; and, finally, the reasons why Gorbachev accepted the dissolution of the Soviet empire, abandoned his ‘strategic ally’ and consented to the unified Germany’s membership of NATO. The Soviet Union, the book concludes, had overextended itself in its attempt to maintain imperial control by the constant application of ‘hard power’. The lesson for today is obvious, but Putin appears set to repeat the fateful course pursued by his Soviet predecessors.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Adomeit, Hannes

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Kolonialismus, Imperialismus
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Ost-West Beziehungen
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Weltgeschichte & Geschichte einzelner Länder und Gebietsräume Europäische Geschichte
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Außenpolitik
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Geschichte
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Geopolitik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2; PREFACE;11
2.1; Persisting Myths;11
2.2; ‘Imperial Overstretch’ under Putin;12
2.3; ‘Eastern Europe’;13
2.4; Personal Background and Thanks;14
2.5; Transliteration of Russian Terms;16
3; INTRODUCTION;17
3.1; Sources of Evidence;28
4; PART ONE: THE SOVIET EMPIRE;31
4.1; Chapter 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations;33
4.1.1; 1. Conceptual Approaches;33
4.1.2; 2. Metrocentric Approaches;38
4.1.3; 3. Pericentric Approaches;41
4.1.4; 4. International Systemic and Structural Approaches;46
4.1.5; 5. Transnational Approaches;55
4.1.6; 6. An Integrative Approach;60
5; PART TWO: EXPANSION;65
5.1; Chapter 2: The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm;67
5.1.1; 1. Parameters of the Paradigm;67
5.1.1.1; The Ideological Dimension;68
5.1.1.2; The Imperial Dimension;73
5.1.2; 2. The Division of Germany: Design or Default?;75
5.1.2.1; Option One: The ‘Revolutionary Transformation’ of Germany;78
5.1.2.2; Option Two: Emasculation of Germany;80
5.1.2.3; Option Three: Division and Dismemberment;85
5.1.2.4; Option Four: Neutralization of Germany;89
5.1.3; 3. The Paradigm Applied: East Germany and Eastern Europe;91
5.1.4; 4. The Impact of the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War;102
5.1.5; 5. Stalin’s 1952 ‘Peace Note’: Lost Opportunity or Political Manoeuvre?;110
5.1.6; 6. Imperial Dilemmas: Beria and the Crisis in the GDR;116
5.1.7; 7. Imperial Dilemmas: The Berlin Wall;125
5.1.8; 8. Consolidation of the Soviet Empire and the ‘Correlation of Forces’;137
5.1.9; 9. Soviet Responses to West Germany’s Ostpolitik;142
5.1.10; 10. Soviet Responses to East Germany’s Assertiveness;150
5.2; Chapter 3: The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire;163
5.2.1; 1. The Crisis of Ideology;163
5.2.2; 2. Military Power and Declining Political Influence;167
5.2.3; 3. Declining Economic Performance and the "Costs of Empire";174
5.2.3.1; The Military-Industrial Complex and the Challenge of SDI;178
5.2.4; 4. The Domestic Political Crisis;183
5.2.5; 5. The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-East German Relations;191
5.2.6; 6. The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-West German Relations;199
5.2.7; 7. Debts, Dependency, and Intra-German Relations;203
5.2.8; 8. Pravda Articles of Faith;209
5.2.9; 9. The Chernenko-Honecker Emergency Meeting in Moscow;212
5.2.9.1; Chernenko’s Response: The Empire Strikes Back;221
5.2.9.2; The Ustinov-Honecker Exchanges;224
5.2.9.3; The Gorbachev-Honecker Exchanges;225
5.2.9.4; Summary;228
6; PART FOUR: COLLAPSE;231
6.1; Chapter 4: Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking;233
6.1.1; 1. The Paradigm of New Thinking;233
6.1.2; 2. Gorbachev: A Political Profile;239
6.1.3; 3. Gorbachev’s Perceptions of the German Problem;259
6.1.4; 4. East Germany: Strategic Ally but Waning Economic Asset;266
6.1.4.1; The GDR in Gorbachev’s Economic Strategy;270
6.1.4.2; Political Aspects of Soviet-East German Relations;279
6.1.5; 5. West Germany: Troublesome Tenant in Gorbachev’s ‘Common House of Europe’;291
6.1.5.1; The Common House of Europe;299
6.1.6; 6. Priority for the Relations with the United States;305
6.1.7; 7. German Unification in a ‘Hundred Years’;313
6.1.7.1; German Unity: ‘In a Hundred Years’?;319
6.1.8; 8. Gorbachev and Eastern Europe: Decline of the Will to Empire;328
6.1.8.1; The Demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine;335
6.1.8.2; Soviet-East German Relations: Deference versus Defiance;342
6.1.9; Summary;357
6.2; Chapter 5: Domestic Implications of Gorbachev’s German Policy;361
6.2.1; 1. The Institutional Setting;361
6.2.2; 2. The Academy of Sciences: International Relations Institutes and Specialists;365
6.2.3; 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs;379
6.2.4; 4. The CPSU: Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee Departments;393
6.2.4.1; Yakovlev and the Party Apparat;397
6.2.4.2; The Central Committee Departments and Commissions;401
6.2.4.3; Comprehensive Reorganization of the Party Apparat;406
6.2.4.4; Falin’s Role in Policy-Making;411
6.2.5; 5. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces;416
6.2.5.1; Perestroika, Democratization, and Glasnost in the Armed Forces;418
6.2.5.2; The Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic;427
6.2.5.3; The Controversy Over the Use of Force;431
6.2.6; 6. The KGB;438
6.2.6.1; The Impotence of Omnipotence;441
6.2.6.2; KGB Operations in Germany;450
6.2.6.3; Putin at the Dresden rezidentura;457
6.3; Chapter 6: The Last Crisis;463
6.3.1; 1. The Transformed Internal and International Setting;463
6.3.1.1; Mounting Domestic Problems;463
6.3.1.2; Eastern Europe: Breaking Through the Socialist Framework;467
6.3.1.3; West Germany: The New Soviet Priority;478
6.3.2; 2. The Demise of the Honecker Regime;488
6.3.2.1; Truth and Consequences;503
6.3.3; 3. Gorbachev and Krenz;507
6.3.4; 4. The Collapse of the Berlin Wall;525
6.3.4.1; German Unification on the National Agenda;532
6.3.5; 5. German Unification on the International Agenda;536
6.3.5.1; Gorbachev, Genscher, and Kohl's ‘Diktat’;546
6.3.5.2; European Concerns and the Four Power Card: Four Minus Two?;555
6.3.6; 6. Gorbachev's Acceptance of German Unification;563
6.3.6.1; Acceleration of the Demise of the GDR;567
6.3.6.2; Yielding the Key to German Unity;576
6.3.7; 7. Gorbachev's Consent to United Germany's Membership in NATO;596
6.3.7.1; Gorbachev and the Atlantic Alliance;599
6.3.7.2; Soviet Retrenchment;612
6.3.7.3; Military and Party Opposition;621
6.3.7.4; The Consent to NATO Membership;630
6.3.7.5; The Demise of the Warsaw Pact;643
6.3.7.6; The Balance Sheet: Defeat or ‘Win-Win’?;650
6.3.7.7; The Myth of the NATO ‘Guarantee’ Not to Embark on Eastern Enlargement;654
6.3.8; 8. The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent;659
6.3.8.1; Negotiations on German Economic Assistance and the Kurile Islands;680
6.4; CONCLUSIONS;683
6.4.1; The Gorbachev Era;687
6.4.2; Collapse of the Soviet Empire: The Utility of Theories of Imperialism;695
6.4.3; Lessons Unlearned: Putin in Brezhnev’s Footsteps;702
7; APPENDIX;709
7.1; Notes on Archival Research;711
7.2; Biographical Notes;713
7.3; List of Interviews;717
7.4; Bibliography;719
7.5; Glossary and Abbreviations;743
7.6; Abalkin, Leonid;747